YOU CAN’T JUDGE A COP BY HIS TICKETS

At least not in Illinois, because that state has what is commonly known as a quota law. It prohibits a municipality, for the purposes of evaluating an officer's job performance, of comparing the number of tickets that they write, to the number of tickets written by other police officers with similar jobs. Specifically, Illinois Municipal Code, 65 ILCS 5/11-1-12 provides: 

Quotas prohibited. A municipality may not require a police officer to issue a specific number of citations within a designated period of time. This prohibition shall not affect the conditions of any federal or State grants or funds awarded to the municipality and used to fund traffic enforcement programs.

A municipality may not, for purposes of evaluating a police officer's job performance, compare the number of citations issued by the police officer to the number of citations issued by any other police officer who has similar job duties. Nothing in this Section shall prohibit a municipality from evaluating a police officer based on the police officer's points of contact. For the purposes of this Section, "points of contact" means any quantifiable contact made in the furtherance of the police officer's duties, including, but not limited to, the number of traffic stops completed, arrests, written warnings, and crime prevention measures. Points of contact shall not include either the issuance of citations or the number of citations issued by a police officer.

A home rule municipality may not establish requirements for or assess the performance of police officers in a manner inconsistent with this Section. This Section is a denial and limitation of home rule powers and functions under subsection (g) of Section 6 of Article VII of the Illinois Constitution. (Emphasis supplied.)

See generally, Edwards, G., and Rushin, S., “The Effect of Police Quota Laws”, Iowa L Rev, Vol 109 (2024), 2127-2184.

Arbitrator E. Frank Cornelius, PhD, JD interpreted and applied Illinois’ quota law in the case of Illinois FOP and City of Columbia, Illinois, 2025 BNA LA 327, 2025 WL 4058842 (December 10, 2025). His opinion can be accessed from his website, arbitrator.org, by clicking on the OPINIONS icon and scrolling to case Number 100, or directly by clicking on Case 100. The Columbia case had a complicated background, as described by this AI summary:  

A full-day arbitration hearing was held in Columbia, Illinois, at which the parties were afforded a full and fair opportunity to present testimony, exhibits, and argument. The matter concerned the City’s decision to demote a police sergeant and impose a five-day suspension. The Union challenged both the factual predicate for the discipline and its consistency with the parties’ Agreement and governing law.

The grievant had been the subject of sustained supervisory scrutiny over a period of time. The City documented concerns relating to supervisory effectiveness, including deficiencies in leadership, initiative, and adherence to departmental expectations. These concerns were not addressed precipitously; rather, the City employed progressive measures—counseling, evaluation, and documented feedback—before resorting to formal discipline.

The Union disputed both the severity of the penalty and the framework within which the grievant’s performance was evaluated. Of particular significance is the Union’s contention that the City impermissibly relied upon enforcement activity metrics—specifically, expectations tied to citation and stop activity—in a manner inconsistent with Illinois law prohibiting ticket quotas. The Union maintained that such reliance infected the disciplinary decision and rendered it unlawful and contractually defective.

The arbitrator agreed, in part, with the Union on this point. Illinois law prohibits municipalities from establishing or maintaining ticket quotas or using numerical enforcement targets as a basis for discipline. The evidentiary record demonstrated that, while the City did not maintain an express quota policy, it nevertheless incorporated numerical expectations into its evaluation of the grievant’s performance. Testimony and documentary evidence reflect that enforcement activity levels—whether framed as “productivity,” “self-initiated activity,” or otherwise—were considered in assessing the grievant’s effectiveness as a supervisor.

To the extent that such considerations functioned as de facto quotas, they are incompatible with the statutory prohibition. Discipline may not lawfully rest, in whole or in part, upon an officer’s failure to meet numerical enforcement benchmarks. On this issue, the Union’s position was well taken. The arbitrator found that any reliance on citation or stop counts as a measure of performance could not be sustained.

However, that conclusion did not end the inquiry. The question remained whether the discipline, stripped of any improper reliance on numerical enforcement activity, was nevertheless supported by just cause. The record, viewed in its entirety, demonstrated that the City’s concerns extended well beyond enforcement metrics. Independent of any numerical considerations, the grievant’s performance deficiencies—particularly in the areas of supervision, accountability, and responsiveness to command expectations—were repeatedly identified and documented.

The grievant was placed on clear notice of these deficiencies and afforded multiple opportunities to improve. The City’s response was progressive and measured, even excessively so. Even excluding any improper consideration of enforcement numbers, substantial evidence remained to support the conclusion that the grievant failed to perform at the level required of the rank.

The CBA required that discipline be supported by just cause. That standard was satisfied here, albeit with the important caveat noted above. The demotion and suspension were grounded in legitimate, non-quota-related performance deficiencies and are proportionate to the circumstances presented.

Accordingly, the grievance was denied in part and sustained in part. The arbitrator sustained the Union’s objection to the City’s reliance on numerical enforcement activity to the extent reflected in the record and directed that such considerations be disregarded in future evaluations and disciplinary determinations. He also ordered that past evidence prohibited by the quota law be expunged from grievant’s personnel file. However, the discipline imposed—demotion and suspension—was otherwise supported by just cause and sustained. ■ (End of AI summary.)

In Policemen's Benevolent Labor Committee v City of Sparta, Illinois, 2020 IL 125508, 450 Ill Dec 496, 181 NE 3d 848 (2020), the Illinois Supreme Court made it quite clear that the quota statute means exactly what it says, so that it applied to the City’s improper actions in this case, taken on or after January 1, 2019, the effective date of the statute. The arbitrator ordered that grievant’s personnel file be cleansed of improper data and suggested that it might be prudent to do the same for other officers who had been rated according to impermissible data.

Although there was no doubt that the City violated the statute, the issue of an arbitrator’s authority to order a party to take affirmative action was raised. After noting that courts are not in agreement about the limits of arbitral authority, Elkouri & Elkouri, How Arbitration Works (Bloomberg BNA, 8^th ed, 2016) @ 18-3 states this:

It is noteworthy that broad remedial authority is granted to arbitrators under the Uniform Arbitration Act,⁷ in force in a majority of states, which specifies that “the fact that the relief was such that it could not or would not be granted by a court of law or equity is not ground for vacating or refusing to confirm the award.⁸

⁷  7 U.L.A. §5 (1955).  [710 ILCS 5/5]

⁸  7 U.L.A. §12(a)(5).  [710 ILCS 5/12(a)(5)]

See also, id., 2017 Supplement @ 18-2—18-3.

In the opinion, the arbitrator noted at the outset that the case was covered by the Illinois version of the Uniform Arbitration Act:

The parties agreed that the Uniform Arbitration Act, 710 ILCS 5/1-23, applies to this case. American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees v Department of Central Management Services, 173 Ill 2d 299, 671 NE 2d 668 (1996) (extensive discussion); American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees v Department of Central Management Services, 222 Ill App 3d 678, 584 NE 2d 317 (1991).

Not only does the Arbitration Act give an arbitrator wide discretion for formulating remedies, it also equips the arbitrator with subpoena power to compel the attendance of witnesses. 710 ILCS 5/7. Subpoena power also is found in the Federal Arbitration Act. 9 USC § 7.

A word of caution: It is important to understand that states may enact variations of the “uniform” act and so constrain an arbitrator’s remedial authority and even jurisdiction, but Illinois’ statute is quite comprehensive.

The City of Columbia appeared to be hamstrung by the progressive discipline provision of the CBA, so the arbitrator pointed out the following:

As to Grievant's claim … that the discipline imposed upon him was "not progressive", progressive discipline need not be applied in every case, if the misconduct is truly serious. Dept of Cent Mgt Servs v AFSCME, 245 Ill App 3d 87, 185 Ill Dec 379, 614 NE 2d 513 (1993); Rockford v Unit Six of Policemen's Benevolent and Protective Assoc of Illinois, 362 Ill App 3d 556, 298 Ill Dec 848, 840 NE 2d 1283 (2005). Moreover, an employer need not prevail on every charge, Lachance v Devall, 178 F3d 1246, 1260 (Fed Cir 1999); Russo v United States Postal Service, 284 F3d 1304 (Fed Cir 2002), although the discipline imposed may be reduced if the charges are not of equal seriousness. Office of the Sheriff, 107 LA 972, 1996 WL 34574727, 24 LAIS 3328 (Arb 1996).

A most important point about progressive discipline was made in AFGE Local 1770 and Department of Army, 2022 BNA LA 252, 2022 BL 281061, 22-2 ARB ¶ 8040, 2022 WL 3644541, 122 LRP 27029 (Cornelius Arb 2022), when it was noted that “the Merit Systems Protection Board has explained that settlement agreements with employees ARE a form of progressive discipline.” Further information about such contractual settlements, often denominated “last chance agreements”, can be found in some of the arbitrator’s blog posts. After reading the arbitrator’s opinion, the City of Columbia may take a less formulaic approach to progressive discipline.

Questions can be addressed to the arbitrator at CONTACT.